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ABSTRACT  
In this research we propose new protocols in group-based 
cryptography contributing to the research of finding novel 
cryptographic systems that are secure against quantum 
computers.  The protocols we introduce either employ 
different one-way functions or different groups then the 
currently available protocols in group-based 
cryptography.  Thereby, we avoid the successful attacks 
that threaten the contemporary existing group-based 
cryptosystems. 
Keywords: conjugacy, cryptography, groups, post-
quantum, protocol, subgroups.    
INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, cryptography is the science of writing in 
secret code. Its main objective is to enable 
communication between two or more parties without 
eavesdroppers being able to intercept this communication. 
Presently, there is an increasing demand for secure 
cryptosystems due to the enormous increase of 
applications like internet shopping or electronic financial 
transfers. 
The basic idea of cryptography is the use of a so-called 
one-way-function or trapdoor-function: an action which is 
easy to perform but hard to invert, except if one is in the 
possession of some ‘extra’ knowledge. In this case it 
should again be easy to invert to process. 
Over the past decades, attempts have been made to create 
secure cryptographic protocols, based on several 
mathematical structures. From these, the protocols based 
on number theoretic issues have been most widely used 
and form the core of nearly all contemporarily used 
cryptographic protocols. 
In our research we have attempted to set up protocols 
based on the structure of non-abelian groups and thereby 
contribute to the research called group-based 
cryptography ([7]). 
A group is a mathematical structure consisting of a set of 
objects and an operation on these objects, which is 
invertible. Examples of groups used in our research are 
groups of matrices, and permutation groups. 
We have designed two new protocols based on group 
theoretic issues. In one of the protocols, the novelty lies 
in the introduction of a new type of one-way-function, 
conjugacy of subgroups, while in the other protocol we 
use a standard one-way-function but apply it in a class of 
groups which has not been used for cryptographic 
purposes before. For the sake of clarity and brevity we 
will only describe the first of these protocols in this 
paper, thereby still covering most of the new ideas. 
CRYPTOGRAPHY 
As mentioned, the basic idea of cryptography is the use of 
a one-way-function: some action we can easily perform 
but that we cannot invert unless we have some extra 
knowledge.  Classical examples of this include the 
permutation of letters of the alphabet to encrypt some 
written text. Indeed if we have a message and we are 
given a permutation of the alphabet (for example we write 
‘b’  instead of ‘a’, ‘c’ instead of ‘b’ etc.) then we can 
easily perform the permutation on the message. However, 
unless we know what permutation is used, it is difficult 
(at least it was in former times) to find the original 
message when we are only given the encrypted piece of 
text.  
Contemporary cryptography consists mainly of so-called 
public-key (or asymmetric) cryptography. This is a form 
of cryptography in which two distinct keys are required: a 
secret (or private) key and a public key. Although 
different, these two keys are linked to each other in such a 
way that it is possible to use the public key to encrypt a 
message or to verify a digital signature, whereas the 
private key is used to decrypt a message or to create a 
digital signature. This form of cryptography was 
introduced in 1976 by Diffie and Hellman ([7]). 
The use of public-key cryptography was initiated by a 
new cryptographic protocol called a key-exchange 
protocol. As its name suggests, this protocol is used to 
exchange secret keys between two or more parties. Those 
keys can subsequently be used in encryption protocols or 
signature verifying protocols. The protocol suggested in 
this paper is a novel example of a key-exchange protocol.  
Over the past decades, cryptography has turned its 
attention to abstract mathematics in order to provide 
security for its protocols. Most notably, the difficulty to 
factorize large numbers into their prime factors has been 
at the core of many cryptographic applications for over 
fifty years. However, there is an ever increasing demand 
for cryptographic applications and most notably the 
possible foundation of a quantum computer, from which 
it is known that it breaks most of our current 
cryptographic protocols, forms a serious threat to 
contemporary cryptographic protocols ([9]). Therefore, 
the introduction of novel cryptographic protocols, based 
on different mathematical structures and one-way-
functions, is highly desirable ([7]).    
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GROUP-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY 
As a response to this call for novel cryptographic 
protocols, several papers have been published, starting 
with [1] and [4], that introduce the concept of group-
based cryptography. These protocols are based on the 
algebraic structure of a group and use operations in a 
group as their one-way-function.  
A group in mathematics is defined as a set of objects in 
which two objects can be composed to obtain a third one. 
In addition, for every element there exists an inverse 
element, meaning that we can ‘undo’ any operation that 
we have performed. An example of a group is the integer 
numbers with the operation of addition. Indeed, if we take 
the set of all integers:                          and we 
add two of them, we find another integer. Moreover, for 
any integer   there exists the integer    which has the 
property that first adding   and then    results in no 
change at all. This shows that    is the inverse element 
of  . Hence the integers form a group.  
Important to note here is that the above group is said to be 
commutative, since for any integers   and   we have that 
       , loosely speaking: it does not matter in 
which order we compose the group elements. However, 
in many groups this order does matter. Groups in which 
this is the case will be called non-abelian groups and it is 
precisely those groups that group-based cryptography is 
interested in.  
Most commonly the operation in groups is written as 
multiplication (instead of addition like in the above 
example). Hence, for group elements   and   we write 
        for applying the composition of these 
elements. We stress that in non-abelian groups, in general 
we have      . This will mainly be used in a process 
called conjugation of elements. We say that the product 
      is the conjugate of   by  , where     denotes the 
inverse of the element  . Note that conjugate elements 
coincide precisely when      , since in this case 
             , but otherwise they are different 
elements. 
In the research on group-based cryptography, the so-
called conjugacy search problem has played a major role 
([1], [4]). In an instance of the conjugacy search problem 
one is given two elements     of a given group  , which 
are conjugate by some unknown group element    i.e. we 
have        . The problem then is to find an element 
  such that           Note that the unknown element   
will do the job, but there may be different group elements 
that also conjugate   to   . 
In the first articles on group-based cryptography, 
conjugacy was used as a one-way function, i.e. the 
security of the protocols relied on the difficulty of the 
conjugacy search problem ([1], [4]). However, powerful 
attacks based on some notion of the length of group 
elements (the length is defined as the minimum number 
of generators needed to write the element as a product of 
generators) have shown that the conjugacy search 
problem provides a much lower level of security than 
required ([7]). Therefore, we suggest a protocol using a 
novel one-way function that uses conjugacy in a different 
way.  
A NEW CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOL 
In this section we will introduce a key-exchange protocol 
based on the computational difficulty of the subgroup 
conjugacy search problem in permutation groups. In order 
to do so, we will discuss the mathematical background of 
the protocol.  
We will use a group of permutations as our platform 
group. Each element of this group is a function permuting 
the numbers 1 to   for some chosen integer  . The 
operation in this group is the composition of mappings, 
the inverse of any element is the reverse permutation 
moving every number back to its original position. We 
use the notation    for the group of permutations of the 
numbers 1 to   and call   the degree of   .  
Furthermore, our protocol will make essential use of the 
notion of a subgroup: Given some group   we will call a 
subset   of   a subgroup of   if   is a group in its own 
right. For example the set of even numbers forms a 
subgroup of the integers. If    is a subgroup of   we 
write           
The protocol is based on the subgroup conjugacy search 
problem, which extends the notion of conjugacy from 
group elements to (sub-)groups. We denote by       the 
group of elements of the form       where   runs over 
all elements of   and call this the conjugate group of   
by  .  
We now give a description of the protocol in which two 
parties, usually called Alice and Bob, create a common 
secret key: 
 Public information: Positive integers   and  , 
with   even and       . Furthermore, a 
subgroup        (given by generators); and 
two commuting subgroups        and 
        (i.e. for every element   in   and 
every   in   we demand that       .  
 Private information:  
o Alice: an element   in  . 
o Bob: an element   in   
 The protocol: 
o Alice computes         and sends 
it to Bob. 
o Bob computes         and sends it 
to Alice. 
o Alice and Bob both compute   
          . The common secret key 
is the  -th element in   with respect to 
the lexicographic order of permutations.  
Note that Alice and Bob can both compute   because    
and   commute, Alice computes it as             
      and likewise Bob computes it as   
               .  
ANALYSIS 
For the above protocol we make some remarks on its 
complexity and on possible ways of attacking the 
protocol. Before that, we comment on the choices that 
have to be made in the protocol:  
 For the public key   we advise to choose   as an 
elementary abelian 2-subgroup, meaning that any 
element has order 2 (performing twice the same 
permutation yields the identity map) and elements 
within   commute with each other. We recommend this 
choice because any knowledge on the structure of 
elements in   which is invariant under conjugation will 
also show up in the elements of any conjugate 
subgroup, thus also in  . One of these structural 
properties are the orbits of   on the numbers between 1 
and   . We say that any two numbers   and   are in 
the same orbit under   if there exists a permutation   
in   such that   maps   to    Under conjugation this 
property is preserved in the sense that the number of 
orbits and their sizes are equal under   and under  . 
For an elementary abelian 2-subgroup all orbits have 
size 2, therefore no additional information is leaked to 
an attacker. Moreover, in this way we maximize the 
number of orbits under   which, among others, makes 
it difficult to construct a so-called Base and Strong 
Generating Set (BSGS) for   which is a standard tool 
for making computations in permutation groups 
efficient and would almost certainly be required for an 
attack on the protocol ([6]). 
Lastly, we recommend that   has roughly √      
elements (the square root of the number of elements in 
     to ensure that both   and its coset space (a 
partition of the elements of     in parts of the same size 
as  ) are large and thereby averting brute force and 
quotient attacks ([7]).  
 For the public keys   and   we recommend on 
choosing  them as large as possible. Indeed, the secret 
keys are chosen from the subgroups   and    Hence, 
choosing small subgroups would enable brute force 
attacks. One possibility is to choose   to be the set of 
all permutations that fix the numbers      up to    
while permuting the numbers   to   amongst 
themselves. Similarly   is the set of permutations 
fixing the first   numbers while permuting the last   
ones. In this way elements from   commute with those 
of   and both   and   have    elements. Hence the key 
space grows very fast with increasing  .  
Secondly, we comment on the method that Alice and Bob 
employ to find the  -th element in lexicographic order 
from     In order to do this we transform the abelian 2-
subgroup   into a linear code over the field with two 
elements (i.e. a binary code). For the technical 
construction to do this we refer to [3]. Important in this 
construction is that it can be done very efficiently and that 
it preserves the lexicographic order. The  -th element in 
the linear code can be computed very quickly (without 
actually enumerating all the elements) by using the binary 
expansion of  . Finally, the  -th element of the linear 
code is translated back to the corresponding element of  . 
([3]). Note that the assumption        is used in the 
fact that if   is constructed as above, it contains precisely 
     elements.  
Attacks and complexity 
In this section we will comment on the general difficulty 
of breaking the protocol. The above protocol is based on 
the difficulty of finding a conjugating element between 
two subgroups. Indeed, if one would succeed in finding 
the (secret) element   from the public information   and 
the transmitted information   then one would have 
knowledge of   and   and therefore would be able to 
compute   in the same way as Alice does, and thus find 
the secret key  .   
However, it was shown in [6] that the problem of finding 
a conjugating element between two permutation 
subgroups in general is hard to solve, meaning that the 
time to find a solution grows exponentially with the 
parameter  .  
To execute the protocol we saw that essential use has to 
be made of the possibility to transform the subgroup   
into a binary linear code. However, this construction also 
facilitates a possible attack on the protocol. In the same 
way as   is transformed into a linear code, one could also 
transform the subgroups   and   to binary linear codes. 
By construction, these linear codes will be isomorphic 
([3]). Finding an isomorphism between these linear codes 
will directly provide a conjugating element between the 
corresponding subgroups ([3]), hence the problem of 
finding a conjugating element between the subgroups   
and   translates into the problem of finding an 
isomorphism between binary linear codes. This problem 
has been studied under the heading code-equivalence 
problem and has been part of the research on post-
quantum cryptography - the research on cryptographic 
protocols that are resistant against attacks by quantum 
computers. It is believed that the code-equivalence 
problem is hard and in fact may even provide a platform 
for post-quantum cryptography ([8], [9]). Therefore, we 
conclude that this attack does not pose an actual threat to 
our protocol and in fact provides some decent ground for 
security assumptions.  
As a final, but crucial point we note that the length-based 
attacks that were used to attack protocols based on the 
conjugacy search problem cannot be employed to attack 
our protocol. Indeed, the use of subgroups rather than 
elements was motivated by the fact that it makes these 
attacks infeasible. 
Recommendation on parameters 
In order to get some insight in the complexity of the key-
exchange protocol and the complexity of the above 
mentioned attack on the protocol via binary linear codes, 
we ran some computer experiments. Results of these 
experiments are presented in table 1, ‘Experimental data’,  
below. The first column of the table indicates the value of 
  that has been used (and hence determines in what group 
    we are working). The second and third columns 
present the time it takes to respectively generate a secret 
key, i.e. to perform all steps of the protocol, and the time 
it takes to break to protocol by an attack using linear 
codes. All timings are given in seconds and have been 
averaged over 100 runs for the first four rows and over 
ten runs for the last row. The last column provides the 
interval from the shortest to the longest time it took to 
break the protocol.   Experiments were run using a 3.10 
GHz computer and the V2.19-2 version of the Computer 
Algebra system MAGMA ([2]).  
           Table 1: Experimental data 
From the table we conclude that key generation can be 
done very rapidly using the above mentioned protocol. 
Even for values of       key exchange can take place 
in less than a second.  
Some additional experiments were run in order to be able 
to extrapolate the duration of an attack for larger values 
of   ([3]). From these results we find the same trend as 
can be spotted in the table: the duration of an attack 
grows exponentially with  , increasing   by 1 increases 
the breaking time by a factor of       . Using these 
results we recommend values about 200 for     For these 
values key exchange can be done in less than 0.1 seconds, 
while using the above attack will cost over a million years 
of computation time (on a single computer). We note that 
these parameter sizes are well chosen according to the 
standards in [5].   
Another interesting result that is shown in the table is that 
the variation of the duration of the breaking algorithm is 
actually quite small. This is an important requirement for 
using the above protocol in practical applications, since it 
indicates that breaking the protocol by a ‘lucky strike’ is 
very unlikely.  
CONCLUSION 
In our research project we have suggested a novel 
protocol in group-based cryptography that employs the 
computational difficulty of the subgroup conjugacy 
search problem. With this protocol we intended to avoid 
the length-based attacks that were very effective in 
breaking the existing protocols based on the conjugacy 
search problem.   
For this protocol we have thoroughly investigated the 
computational difficulty in order to find hard instances of 
the subgroup conjugacy search problem. By means of this 
analysis we recommend on employing permutation 
groups of degree about 400 as platform group and to use 
elementary abelian 2-subgroups as public key. 
We showed that one of the attacks against our protocol 
deals with the problem of finding an equivalence between 
binary codes, a problem that has been extensively studied 
in the field of post-quantum cryptography and has the 
potential of being secure against quantum-computer 
attacks ([8], [9]). Therefore, our protocol may even be 
relevant for the post-quantum era. We note that a rigorous 
mathematical proof of the security of the system is (as 
with most cryptographic systems) very challenging. 
However, the results of the above experiments using 
state-of-the-art attack methods and the recommendations 
in ([8], [9]) serve as good indications for the security.   
In our research we moreover took a closer look at 
employing different groups as platform group for our 
protocol and suggest that polycyclic groups are worth 
considering ([3]). More importantly, we introduced 
another novel protocol based on the computational 
difficulty of the decomposition search problem. This 
problem is related to the conjugacy search problem, for 
given group elements   and       it asks to 
reconstruct   and   from   and  . In groups for which no 
useful length function exists this is a hard problem and 
we suggest to use  matrix groups like         for prime 
numbers   as platform groups ([3]).  This second protocol 
also turned out to be very robust against (standard) 
attacks.   
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  Key 
generation 
(s) 
Breaking 
(s) 
Interval (s) 
80 0.005 0.250 [0.200 , 0.300] 
100 0.010 14.16 [12.11 , 21.06] 
110 0.010 72.97 [64.18 , 123.5] 
120 0.015 303.46 [268.90 , 596.8]  
140 0.020 8683.2 [8092.1  ,  9316.8] 
